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With integrated trade and financial markets, a collapse in aggregate demand in a large country can
cause ‘natural real interest rates’ to fall below zero in all countries, giving rise to a global ‘liquidity
trap’. This paper explores the policy choices that maximize the joint welfare of all countries following
such a shock, when governments cooperate on both fiscal and monetary policy. Adjusting to a large
negative demand shock requires raising world aggregate demand, as well as redirecting demand towards
the source (home) country. The key feature of demand shocks in a liquidity trap is that relative prices
respond perversely. A negative shock causes an appreciation of the home terms of trade, exacerbating
the slump in the home country. At the zero bound, the home country cannot counter this shock. Because
of this, it may be optimal for the foreign policy-maker to raise interest rates. Strikingly, the foreign
country may choose to have a positive policy interest rate, even though its ‘natural real interest rate’
is below zero. A combination of relatively tight monetary policy in the foreign country combined with
substantial fiscal expansion in the home country achieves the level and composition of world expenditure
that maximizes the joint welfare of the home and foreign country. Thus, in response to conditions
generating a global liquidity trap, there is a critical mutual interaction between monetary and fiscal
policy.
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This paper is concerned with global policy responses to a world liquidity trap. The macroe-
conomic situation of the world economy was profoundly altered by the experience of the
Great Recession that began in 2008. By general consensus, the source of the shock was the
US nancial sector, but this subsequently led to a fall in world aggregate demand, spilling
over to the economies of many other countries. How should policymakers respond when
aggregate demand shocks push world `natural real interest rates' below zero? As is well
known (e.g. Eggertson and Woodford 2003), when desired real interest rates are below zero,
there is a failure of the `divine coincidence' that monetary policy can simultaneously de-
liver zero ination and a zero output gap. Of course, even when policy interest rates are
at a lower bound, monetary policy may still be eective through an expectations channel,
but the eectiveness of announcements about future monetary policy is questionable, given
the implausibility of `committing to be irresponsible' in the future (Krugman 1998). An
alternative is to use scal policy. In the aftermath of the crisis, many countries followed
signicant expansions in government decits, reducing taxes and/or increasing government
spending. At the beginning of the downturn, there was a concerted eort to coordinate these
scal expansion across countries, through the G20 process and other venues. But the ensuing
scal responses were far from uniform across dierent countries. In addition, some countries
have already begun to raise policy rates, while in the US, interest rates remain eectively at
their zero bound.
A key question is how the `burden of adjustment' to a global recession should be shared
across countries that experience the downturn at dierent levels of severity.This specic
focus of the paper is to identify an optimal policy response to a world liquidity trap in which
two trading partners are well integrated through nancial markets but less than perfectly
integrated in goods markets. We think of an aggregate demand shock as coming from
one country, but spilling over into other countries by pushing down desired real interest
rates below zero in all countries. A policy response in our model is a joint monetary-scal
package, and we focus on cooperative policies. We emphasize that a liquidity trap is not
a mechanical occurance, but a decision to reduce policy rates to zero when the natural real
interest rate goes below zero. In this respect, the international dimension to macroeconomic
policy at the zero lower bound introduces some intriguing complications. The particular
complicating feature is the degree of trade integration. With highly open trade linkages, the
optimal policy response closely mirrors that of a closed economy. Policy interest rates are
set at zero, and both economies should follow similarly expansionary scal packages. The
2reason is that when international trade is highly integrated, a demand slump in one country
is felt equally in all other countries, via interconnected goods and nancial markets. Output
and ination in all countries will respond symmetrically to demand shocks, regardless of
the source of the shock, and the optimal policy response is to have interest rates as low as
possible, and an equal scal expansion in all countries.
However, the benchmark of fully open trade does not closely approximate the current
conguration of the world economy, where large, but relatively closed economies, such as
Japan and the United States, are stuck in a liquidity trap. In these countries, exports make
up substantially less than 20% of GDP. With home bias in consumption baskets, which acts
so as to reduce trade linkages between countries, both the propagation of demand shocks and
the optimal response of policy to shocks takes on very dierent characteristics. Typically, a
large negative demand shock in one country will push down the desired real interest rate in
that country more than those of its trading partners. Moreoever, the introduction of home
bias complicates the analysis of optimal policy, since the international eects of a demand
shock on output and ination are not distributed equally across countries.
The key feature of the environment with home bias in trade is that a shock that precip-
itates a liquidity trap generates a perverse response of the terms of trade. Under `normal'
monetary policy, a fall in demand will reduce domestic real interest rates and lead to a com-
pensating terms of trade deterioration, channelling more world demand towards the country
directly aected by the shock. But when the interest rate is at the zero bound, this same
shock generates a terms of trade appreciation, since it tends to raise domestic real interest
rates by pushing down ination expectations. Hence, the response of the terms of trade
exacerbates the eect of the shock. Typically, in order to alleviate a terms of trade appre-
ciation, a country could engage in expansionary monetary policy. But when interest rates
are zero, the home country (which is the source of the shock) cannot do this. But instead,
the foreign country can raise its interest rate. We nd in fact that an optimal cooperative
response involves a large scal expansion in the home country, and a positive interest rate
for the foreign country, in conjunction with a small scal expansion. That is, the least
hit (foreign) economy should only minimally engage in a cooperative scal expansion, but
should set its policy rate above its natural real interest rate. Strikingly, we nd that the best
policy (from a global cooperative perspective), is for the foreign country to tighten monetary
policy, even though using the standard criterion from the closed economy logic, it should
still be in a liquidity trap (where its `natural' real interest rate is below zero). The foreign
interest rate increase acts so as weaken the appreciation of the home terms of trade caused
by the original demand shock, limiting the degree of world expenditure switching away from
3the home economy. Overall, it is best for both countries to have higher interest rates in the
trading partner, when the source country shock requires zero home interest rates.
Our results in fact show that the response of policy interest rates in a global liquidity
trap are piecewise functions of the degree of trade-openness, as measure by the parameter of
`home bias' in preferences. When preferences are identical, trade is fully open, and a global
liquidity trap is associated with zero policy rates in all countries. For a shock coming from
the home country, home policy rates are always set equal to zero. As preferences display more
home bias, both policy rates are still zero for some interval. But at a critical threshold level
of home bias, foreign interest rates are raised, even when the foreign natural real interest
rate is negative. As the degree of home bias rises, foreign policy rates rise more and more,
and are always set above the foreign natural real interest rate.
The message is that the open economy dimension has very substantial implications for
both the occurrance of a liquidity trap, in the sense that it predicts that policy is not
restricted by the zero lower bound even when traditional indicators (which look at the value
of the `natural real interest rate') say that it should be, and for the way in which policy is
designed when the world economy `on average' is in a liquidity trap. More generally, the
model predicts that the `burden of adjustment' to a global liquidity trap may be spread quite
unequally across countries, and implies some apparently counterintuitive policy responses.
An alternative perspective on the results is that they show how monetary and scal
policy should be used in a mutually supportive way in responding to a global liquidity trap
shock. If monetary policy were set in a conventional way, so that policy rates were equal
to natural real interest rates, except when the latter variables were below zero, then all the
burden of adjustment would be on scal policy. In this case, in order to facilitate expenditure
adjustment and expenditure switching, a policy response would require a large home scal
expansion and foreign scal contraction. The reason is that scal expansion in a liquidity
trap generates terms of trade depreciation - (Cook and Devereux, 2011). The benet of
adjusting foreign interest rates optimally is that it relieves (but does not eliminate) the need
for large scal responses in each country.
The paper builds on a substantial recent literature on monetary and scal policy in
a liquidity trap. In particular, with the experience of Japan in mind Krugman (1999),
Eggertson and Woodford (2003, 2005), Jung et al. (2005), Svensson (2003), Auerbach and
Obstfeld (2004) and many other writers explored how monetary and scal policy could be
usefully employed even when the authorities have no further room to reduce short term
nominal interest rates. Recently, a number of authors have revived this literature in light of
the very similar problems now encountered by the economies of Western Europe and North
4America. Papers by Christiano et al (2009), Devereux (2010), Eggertson (2009), Taylor
et al. (2008) have explored the possibility for using government spending expansions, tax
cuts, and monetary policy when the economy is in a liquidity trap. For the most part,
these papers did not focus on the international dimension of liquidity traps. Some recent
expections are Fujiwara et al. (2009, 2010), Erceg et al. (2009) and Jeanne (2009). Jeanne
(2009) examines a `global liquidity trap' in a model of one-period ahead pricing similar to
that of Krugman (2009). Erceg. et al (2009) use a fully specic two country DSGE model
to examine the international transmission of shocks when one country is in a liquidity trap,
but do not focus on optimal monetary policy or scal policy choices. Fujiwara et al. (2009)
examine the optimal monetary problem with commitment in a multi country situation, but
do not examine the determination of scal policy, or the transmission of demand shocks
across countries. Fujiwara et al. (2010) look at the impact of the international eects of
scal policy in a liquidity trap, examing the sign and size of domestic and international
scal multipliers. Our paper may be seen as complementary to theirs in that we extend the
analysis to incorporate trade frictions, but more importantaly, investigate the determination
of optimal policy1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the basic model.
Section 3 examines the solution under sticky prices. Then in section 4 we analyze the
impact of scal policies at the zero lower bound, and the role of international spillovers of
policies. Section 5 examines the optimal policy making problem in a global cooperative
agreement, including the possibility of using both monetary and scal policy for the least
aected countries. Some conclusions are then oered.
2 A two country model of interacting monetary and
scal policy
We construct a model in which there are two countries in the world economy. In each country,
households consume both private and government goods, and supply labor. Denote the
countries as `home' and `foreign', with foreign variables denoted with an asterisk superscript.
The population of each country is normalized to unity. Each country produces a range of
dierentiated goods. Complete asset markets allow full insurance of consumption risk across
countries. Households also hold their own country's nominal government bonds. Firms
1In addition, a previous paper (Cook and Devereux, 2011) examines the linkages of natural real interest
rates, the determination of scal multipliers and optimal scal policy in a simpler version of the model of
the present paper, but does not allow for the endogenous response of monetary policy.
5produce private goods, while governments produce government goods which are distributed
uniformly across households. Firms production and supply is constrained by sticky prices.
Governments have access to lump sum taxation.
2.1 Households





t(U(Ct;t)   V (Nt) + J(Gt)) (1)
where U, V , and J represent the utility of the composite home consumption bundle Ct; disu-
tility of labour supply Nt; and utility of the government supplied public good Gt;respectively.
The variable t represents a shock to preferences or `demand' . We assume that U12 > 0.:


















2; CH is the consumption of the home country composite good by
the home household, and CF is consumption of the foreign composite good. If v>1 then there
is a home preference bias for domestic goods. The case v>1 is most realistic for thinking
about policy in large open economies.
Consumption aggregates, CH and CF are composites, dened over a range of home and
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F and for the














6The law of one price holds for each good so Pj(i) = SP 
j (i).where St is the nominal exchange










Home government spending falls on the home composite good and foreign government
spending on the foreign composite good. Thus, government spending is assumed to have
full `home bias'. In addition, we assume that government spending demand for each variety
of home goods has price elasticity , the same as that for private spending.
The household's implicit labor supply at nominal wage Wt is:
UC(Ct;t)Wt = PtV
0(Nt): (2)























Foreign household preferences and choices can be dened exactly symmetrically. The
foreign representative household has weight v=2 , (1 v=2) on the foreign (home) compositive
good in preferences.
2.2 Firms
Each rm i employs labor to produce a dierentiated good.
Yt(i) = Nt(i);
Prots are t(i) = PHt(i)Yt(i) WtHt(i) 1
 indicating a subsidy nanced by lump-sum tax-
ation to eliminate steady state rst order ineciencies. Each rm re-sets its price according
to Calvo pricing with probability of adjusting prices equal to 1   . Firms that adjust their










7where stochastic discount factor mt+j = Pt
UC(Ct;"t)
UC(Ct+j;t+j)
Pt+j . In the aggregate, the price
index for the home good then follows the process given by:







The behaviour of foreign rms and the foreign good price index may be described analogously.
2.3 Market Clearing






































t + Gt: (7)













di: It follows that home country employment (employment for the































t (i)di = YFtV 











An equilibrium in the world economy with positive nominal interest rates may be de-
scribed by the equations (3), and (2), (4), (5) and (6) for the home and foreign economy, as
well as (7) and (8). For given values of Vt and V 
t , given monetary rules (to be discussed
below) and given government spending policies, these equations determine an equilibrium
sequence for the variables Ct;C
t ;Wt;W 
t ;St;PHt; P 




83 New Keynesian Open Economy Model
3.1 Demand Shocks and Natural Interest Rates
Dene    
UCCC
UC as the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consump-
tion,    V 00H
V 0 as the elasticity of the marginal disutility of hours worked and g   J00G
J0
as the elasticity of marginal utility of public goods. In addition, we assume that g =  > 1:
Finally, "t =
UC
UC ln(t) is the measure of a positive demand shock in the home country, with
an equivalent denition for the foreign country. Dene cy = C
Y is the steady state share of
consumption in output.
We assume that any preference shock is unanticipated, and reverts back to zero with
probability 1  in each period. Because there are no predetermined state variables in the
model, this implies that all variables in the world economy will inherit the same persistence
as the shock itself, in expectation. Thus, for any variable xt, we may write Et(xt+1) = xt.
After the shock expires, all variables will then revert to their zero initial equilibrium.
We rst derive a measure of Wicksellian, or `natural' real interest rates for each country,
dened as the interest rates that would hold in a purely exible price equilibrium of the world
economy where there are no monopolistic distortions, and in addition where governments
choose an optimal scal spending rule with access to lump-sum taxes. In this case, the












2 . In a competitive equilibrium with optimal government spending in both countries as
in (9), the natural real interest rate of the home and foreign economy are dened as: 2.













(1   ) (10)
e r
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(1   ) (11)
where   cyD + (1   cy) +  and  > D  (v(2   v) + (1   v)2) > 1: These are
critical variables for our analysis, since they govern the degree to which monetary policy
can be eciently employed to stabilize the economy. In particular, our model has the
characteristic that when (10) and (11) are both positive, then monetary policy can perfectly
2Note that this is dened as the value of rt  EtHt+1 in a exible price economy, or in other words, the
PPI based real interest that would hold with exible prices.
9achieve the joint target of zero ination and zero output gaps, since home and foreign policy
rates can simply be set to equal (10) and (11), respectively. In addition, as seen below, there
will then be no need to have scal gaps dier from zero.
Note that in the no home bias case, when v = 1, the natural interest rate for both
economies should be the same, so that e rt = e r






(1   ). The reason is that,
with no home bias, demand shocks have no eect on the terms of trade. As a result, with
nancial market integration, PPI based real interest rates are equalized across countries. But
in fact, the case v = 1 is not particularly realistic. For most economies, and particularly
for large open economies, the lion's share of demand will come from the domestic economy,
making the home bias case most relevant. We will therefore focus on the more general case
where v > 1.
For concreteness, we also look at the case where the home country is the source of
the shocks. In particular, we will assume that home consumers are aected by preference
shocks which aect their propensity to save, whereas consumers in the foreign economy is not
directly aected by these shocks. Of course foreign consumers will be indirectly aected by
the shock, since integrated nancial markets lead to linkages between interest rates. Thus,
a saving shock with its source in the home economy, pushing the monetary authority into
a liquidity trap, may have similar eects on the foreign economy, even though the foreign
consumers are not directly aected by the shock.
Making this assumption, we have in this case, "




2 and we can write
the natural real interest rates as:
e rt = r +










t = r +
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We may rewrite the natural real interest rate expressions in shorthand as ~ r("t;v) and
~ r("t;v). If the home country shock is suciently negative, then it may drive natural real
interest rates below zero. We dene "H(v) and "F(v) respectively as the size of the shock
such that ~ r("H;v) = 0, and ~ r("F;v) = 0. Clearly, for v  1, "H  "F. Figure 1 illustrates
the two functions ~ r("t;v) and ~ r("t;v). For v = 1, they coincide, while for v = 2, the foreign
natural real interest rate is simply  r. As the countries move from being more open to more
closed, the impact of the shock on the home country natural real interest rate rises, while
the impact on the foreign natural real interest rate falls.
In the discussion below, we will focus on a `large' shock, such that "t < "H(1). This
10means that whatever is v, the home country natural real interest rate is always below zero.
3.2 The World and Relative Economy
We derive a sticky price log-linear approximation of the model in terms of ination and
output gaps in a similar manner to Clarida et al. (2002) and Engel (2010). Let b xt be the
percentage deviation of a given variable xt from the ecient zero exible price equilibrium.
Thus, b xt is interpreted as a `gap' variable. As dened before, D  v(2 v)+(1 v)2 > 1.
In addition, let s  
cy, and s > sD  s
D > 1.
In order to explore the implications of the zero lower bound constraint, we begin with the
standard forward looking ination equations and open economy IS relationships, expressed
in terms of world averages and world relatives. The world average equations are:

W
t = k( + s)b n
W
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The world `relative' variables are written as:

R
t = k( + sD)b n
R
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t  (1   cy)b gW
t and b cg
R
t  (1   cy)b gR
t . The coecient k depends on the degree
of price rigidity. Note that, approximated around the steady state, b nt  b yt, b n
t  b y
t; so the
labor gap for each country will stand in for the output gap.
If the natural interest rates of both economies are always above zero, then the monetary
and scal authorities can achieve perfect price and output stability by setting the nominal
interest rate equal to the natural real interest rate and keeping the scal gaps, b gW
t and b gR
t
equal to zero. However, if one or both countries have a natural real interest rate below zero
then this cannot occur, because then the world and relative policy interest rates cannot be
set to equal world and relative natural rates without at least one policy rate being below
zero.
Note that both systems of equations (for the world average and the world relative
economies) are in the canonical form of the New Keynesian closed economy equations. The
only dierence comes in the parameterization of the inverse elasticity of consumption: s , in
the case of the average economy; and, sD, in the case of the relative world economy. Note
11that sD < s, so the world average level of demand is less sensitive to the average interest rate
than the relative level of demand is sensitive to the relative interest rate. This reects the
expenditure switching eect of terms of trade changes. When worldwide interest rates are
relatively low, then (for intertemporal substitution reasons) world demand will be relatively
high. Analogously, when the relative interest rate is low, demand will be relatively high in
the low interest rate country. But in addition, in order to satisfy interest rate parity, a rel-
atively low real interest rate country must have an anticipated terms of trade appreciation.
This implies a current terms of trade depreciation, leading world aggregate demand to move
towards the low interest rate country through the expenditure switching channel.
4 Global Liquidity Traps
If saving shocks are suciently small (i.e. so that "t > "H(v), then policy rates can adjust to
eliminate the eects of shocks, so that all gaps are zero. For comparison purposes however,
we briey illustrate the impact of a small shock that satises "t > "H(v), but where instead
of adjusting policy rates to oset the shocks, the monetary policy in each country follows a
simple Taylor rule. This comparison is revealing to the extent that it provides a contrast to
the eect of shocks when interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound.
4.1 Demand Shocks under a Taylor rule
The movement of natural real interest rates is as in (10) and (11). But assume that, instead
of osetting the movement in natural real interest rates, policy interest rates are set such
that:
rt =  r + Ht; r

t =  r + Ft (18)
Using (18) in the solutions for world and relative output gaps, gives us:
1b n
W







t = (1   )e r
R
t
where 1  s(1   )(1   ) + (   )k ( + s) > 0; and D
1 = sD(1   )(1   ) + (  
)k ( + sD) > 0; with 1 > D
1 :
A demand shock in the home country ensures that r   e rW
t > 0 and e rR
t < 0. Thus, both
b nW
t and b nR




t = b nW
t   b nR
t : Thus:
12b nt = (1   )
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)










The home output gap falls. The response of the foreign output gap is ambiguous, however,
and depends upon both the strength of the shock as well as the openness of total trade.
When v = 1, e rR
t = 0, and home and foreign output gaps fall by equal amounts. Note that
the rst term inside the square brackets in each equation is independent of v. Then as v
rises above unity, e rR
t falls, D
1 rises, so that the foreign output gap responds by less, and the
home output gap by more.
The negative demand shock always reduces home country ination. Foreign ination is
dened as W
t   R
t ; which may be written as:


t / k ( + s)b n

t + k (s   sD)b n
R
t
A sucient condition for foreign ination to fall is that the foreign output gap falls. But
even if the foreign output gap rises, foreign ination may still fall as a result of the reduction
in the home output gap reducing demand and marginal cost in the foreign economy.
Finally, we may compute the impact of the demand shock on the terms of trade for the
home economy. We may derive the terms of trade response in the following way. From
interest rate parity, it must be that (up to a rst order), we have:
rt   EtHt+1 = r

t   EtFt+1 + Et(b t+1   b t) (19)
Now, using the assumption on persistence of all variables, the fact that the steady state terms









t is negative, the terms of trade must depreciate. Hence, when policy interest rates
are above their zero lower bound, and policymakers follow a Taylor rule, a negative demand
shock in one country is associated with a depreciation in that country's terms of trade, which
cushions the impact of the shock on ination and the output gap.
134.2 Demand Shocks in a liquidity trap
Now assume that the demand shock satises " < "H(1);. Then either one or both countries
will be constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The aect of these
shocks is obviously going to depend on the policy response, both the current and anticipated
future responses. As stated above, we focus only on discretionary policy, assuming that
the current policy-maker cannot credibly make announcements over future monetary policy
actions. The next section examines the optimal policy response to a demand shock. But
rst, we explore the consequences of following the conventional policy, described as
rt = max(0;e rt); r

t = max(0;e r

t) (21)
Under this conjectured policy, each country will set its policy rate to target the natural
interest rate, if this is feasible. Otherwise, policy interest rates will be zero. This is a natural
extension of the optimal discretionary monetary rule in the closed economy literature on the
`zero bound' (e.g. Eggertson and Woodford 2003, Jung et al. 2005)3.
The impact of the shock on home and foreign output gaps depends, for a given shock, on
the actual value of v. We focus on two cases. In both cases, the home policy interest rate
is zero, but the foreign policy rate is only zero for v  vF . If v > vF, then by rule (21), the
foreign monetary authority will set r
t = e r
t.
Case 1. For v  vF, we have
























where 2  s(1 )(1 ) k ( + s) > 0; and D
2 = sD(1 )(1 ) k ( + sD) > 0;
with 2 > D
2 :4
In this case, the home output gap must fall, while the foreign output gap may rise or fall,
depending on the size of v.
Case 2. For v > vF, we have e rW
t = e rR
t = e rt
2 . Then we get:
3In order to implement (21), the authorities would need to follow an interest rate feedback rule which
guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium. See, e.g. Gali (2009)
4These terms must be positive in order that the equilibrium be determinate. This puts a limit on the
degree of persistence of the demand shock.




















Again, the home output gap must fall. But in this case, the foreign output gap will always
rise, because, from the denitions above, we have 2 > D
2 .
It is straightforward to show that a negative demand shock causes the output gap in the
home economy to fall by more when the economy is in a liquidity trap than under a Taylor
rule. A fall in demand during a liquidity trap causes a persistent fall in ination, which,
given no adjustment in the nominal interest rate, causes a rise in the real interest rate, which
causes a further fall in demand. So long as 2 > 0, this process converges when output falls
by a sucient amount.
In the open economy, however, there is a further eect at work. The fall in relative
home country expected ination leads to a rise in the home real interest rate, relative to the
foreign real interest rate. In case 1 above, neither country's policy interest rate responds.
By condition (19), this requires an anticipated terms of trade depreciation for the home
country. Since the shock is temporary, an anticipated terms of trade depreciation can only
be satised by an immediate terms of trade appreciation. Thus, the home country terms








Since in this case, R
t < 0; the home country terms of trade appreciates. Thus, in a liquidity
trap, relative prices move in the `wrong direction', leading to a further fall in demand for
home goods, following the initial negative demand shock. This appreciation helps to explain
why the cross country spillover impact of a negative demand shock may be positive.
In case 2, the appreciation in the terms of trade of the home country is diminished by










The rst term is again negative, but the second term is positive. In general, this can go in
either direction. But in the quantitative analysis below, we see that, even in the case where
the foreign central bank adjusts the policy rate when e r
t > 0, the home terms of trade still
15appreciates.
5 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal policy response to a liquidity trap shock. We
explore optimal cooperative monetary and scal policy responses. While a complete analysis
of the determination of scal and monetary policy in a global liquidity trap would also require
an exploration of the strategic interaction between non-cooperative policy authorities, this
raises dicult technical issues (see Benigno and Benigno 2005), and so is left as a topic for
future research. Focusing on the cooperative problem is a desirable rst approach, since
it sets out a benchmark for choosing a policy so as to maximize world welfare in response to
a negative demand shock that undermines the normal mechanism of monetary policy5.
In order to analyze optimal policy, we rst need to dene an objective function. As
shown in Cook and Devereux (2010a), a second order approximation to an equally weighted
world social welfare can also be constructed in world averages and world dierences.
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5The cooperative approach to scal policy in a global liquidity trap is not necessarily unrealistic. In the
immediate aftermath of the nancial crash of 2008, the G20 group agreed on a joint policy response to the
crisis which assigned target levels of scal stimulus to each member country.
16Thus, the social welfare function faced by the policy maker depends upon output gaps,
ination rates, scal gaps, and the interaction between these variables.
5.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
First, we focus on monetary policy alone. Assume that all scal gaps are zero, and the only
policy instrument available is the policy interest rate in each country. Then the optimal
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The rst two constraints are the ination equations in average and relative terms. The
second two constraints are the average and relative `IS' equations. The nal two constraints
are the non-negativity constraint on the two policy interest rates. The policy optimum
involves the choice of the output gaps,the ination rates and interest rates to maximize this
Lagrangean. The rst order conditions are:
 Ab n
R
t = 2k( + sD) + sD 2 (23)
 Bb n
W







 2t +  1t = 1t (27)
 1t    2t = 2t (28)
Together with the conditions (14)-(17), these equations determine the optimal policy





t;1t;2t; 1t; 2t;1t, and 2t: Combining (25)
and (26) with (23) and (24), we obtain the relationship between world and relative output
17gaps, ination rates, and the multipliers  2t and  1t. Since the underlying demand shock is
either a constant (negative) number, or zero, the solution for all variables during the period
of the shock will be time invariant. Hence we can drop the time notation. Thus:
 Ab n
R = 
R( + sD) + sD 2 (29)
 Bb n
W = 
W( + s) + s 1 (30)
Then, solving the conditions (14)-(17) using the fact that the shock to the natural real
interest rates will revert to zero with probability 1    per period, we have:

R(1   ) = k( + sD)b n
R (31)
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Now using (31) in (23) we get:
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and (33) in (24) we get
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2s: By the properties already dened above, it must be that

D  
, with strict inequality when v < 2:
From (39) and (40), we can now characterize the jointly optimal monetary policy in
terms of the properties of the policy interest rates rt and r
t: The key question is to see the
conditions under which either the home, the foreign, or both non-negativity conditions on
interest rates are binding; i.e. what determines when the zero lower bound is reached for
each country? Note that since " < "H(v); it must be that r = e r(";v) < 0, so clearly the
unconstrained optimal policy is not a feasible solution.
5.2 Characteristics of the optimal policy
We now discuss the characteristics of the optimal policy problem. The critical information
may be obtained from conditions (39) and (40), in conjunction with the characteristics of
the natural real interest rates (10) and (11).
From (27), the home policy interest rate is zero whenever  1+  2 > 0 and from (28) the
foreign rate is zero when  1   2 > 0: In the case v = 1, e rR
t = 0, and e rW
t < 0. Setting
rt = r
t = 0 in (39) and (40), we nd that  1 > 0 and  2 = 0, so that both constraints are
binding. Thus rt = r
t = 0 is a solution when v = 1.
In the more general case, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For " < "H(1), the optimal policy is characterized by the conditions; a)
rt = 0, b) there exists a critical value v; such that (i) for 1  v  v, r













e r("t;v) > 0;
with r
t > e r("t;v); and v < vF:
Proof. To prove the proposition, initially assume that a) holds, so that rt = 0. Then
from (39) and (40), we may write













Dene the right hand side of (41) as J(";v). If J(";v) > 0, then r = 0 must hold.








By the denition of e rW
t (";v) and e rR
t (";v), it must be that e rR
t (";1) = 0, so that J(";1) =
 
e rW
t (";1) > 0, while e rW
t (";2) > e rR




t (";2) < 0,
since from the denitions above, we know that 
 = 
D when v = 2. Hence, by continuity,




t (";v) = 0. 6
Taking v such that 1  v  v; and setting rt = r
t = 0 in (39) and (40) implies that
J(";v) > 0, which conrms the conjecture that both zero bound constraints are strictly
binding, so both policy rates are zero. At v = v, J("; v) = 0, and the home constraint is
strictly binding while for foreign constraint is just binding. For v < v  2, J(";v) < 0.
Then the home country constraint is binding, but the foreign constraint is not binding. Then
for v  v, given that the foreign constraint is not binding, we set 2t = 0 in (28), which
implies that  1 =  2. Using this condition, we set rt = 0 in (39) and (40), and solve for the
equilibrium foreign country interest rate as
r









e r(";v) > 0 (43)
Note that for v  v, this is strictly positive, since from the denition of J(";v); we have
r
t =   2

D+
J(";v) > 0, for v  v.
Moreover, the critical value v must satisfy v < vF. This is because, given the denition
of the natural interest rates, it must be that e rW
t (";vF) =
e rt(";vF)








2 < 0, since 
D > 
. Therefore, the foreign policy rate
is strictly positive, for v  v, even in the range [v;vF], for which the foreign natural real
interest rate is strictly negative.
This establishes part b) of the proposition. To show that part a) holds, assume that
rt = 0. Then for v  v,
1 =  1 +  2 =  
e r
W
t (";v)   
De r
R
t (";v) > 0
6We have not shown that v is unique. However, in extensive simulation over dierent parameter settings,
we did not nd any instances of non-uniqueness.
20so that rt = 0 is conrmed. For v < v  2, using (43), we have
1 =  1 +  2 =  















































e rt(";v) > 0
where the second line equality follows from use of (43), and the third line follows by cancel-
lation and rearrangement. Hence, rt = 0 is satised for v < v  2.
This proposition makes it clear that the sense in which the two countries are in a liquidity
trap is critically determined not by the fact that their respective natural real interest rates
are negative, but by the strength of the shock and the size of the trade ows between the
countries. Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of the foreign interest rate for various values
of v. For a shock that would be large enough to drive the world natural real interest rate
below zero in the fully open world economy (i.e. " < "H(1)); the foreign country will also set
the interest rate at the zero bound, if it is suciently open to trade with the home country
(v  v): But no matter how big is the shock, there is always a v such that, for v  v,
the foreign country will keep its policy interest rate above zero, and also above its natural
interest rate. And there is always an interval [v vF] for which the foreign policy rate is above
zero, even though its natural interest rate below zero.
A similar logic holds for dierent values of the demand shock, for a given v > 1: This leads
to a trade-o between the size of home bias and the size of the shock in the assessement of
whether a liquidity trap in one country spills over into another country. Figure 3 illustrates
this. The Figure illustrates a downward sloping locus of points in v   " space. Above
and to the right of the locus, the foreign country sets a positive policy rate higher than the
foreign natural real interest rate. Below and to the left of the locus, the foreign country is
constrained by the zero lower bound. Note that the locus become steeper has v increases,
because the foreign country is less and less sensitive to foreign demand shocks, the higher is
v. Literally, as v approaches 2, the required negative home demand shock that would put
the foreign country into a liquidity trap becomes innitely large.
The key intuition behind the optimal monetary policy rule comes from the benets of
tempering the home country terms of trade appreciation that occurs in a global liquidity
trap. As we discussed above, when v > 1, the home terms of trade exacerbates the negative
demand eects of the liquidity shock on the home country, drawing world demand away
from home goods rather than cushioning the impact of the fall in demand. The only way
21in which the home monetary authority could limit this is to reduce its interest rate; but of
course at the zero bound, it cannot engage in any further interest rate reduction. But the
foreign country can limit the home terms of trade appreciation by increasing its own interest
rate. For higher and higher values of v, this is of direct benet to the foreign country, since
in those circumstances, it is more likely that the movement in the terms of trade causes an


















For 1  v < v, then t < 0, and the terms of trade appreciates. But as v  v  2, the
appreciation is mitigated by a rise in the foreign policy rate.
The following proposition gives some more insight into the nature of the optimal monetary
policy. We may show that by setting a positive policy rate, the foreign central bank is
importing deation.
Proposition 2 If the foreign central bank follows an optimal r
t > 0, then the home output
gap will be negative and both home and foreign ination will be negative.
Proof. If 2 = 0
 1 =  2   
Multiply both sides of (37) by D to equalize the right side with the right side of (38)
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t < 0. From (44) we have b nR
t < 0 so b nt < 0. From (33) and (31) we have W
t < 0 and
R
t < 0, so t < 0. Insert (33) and (31) into (44):
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Hence, the fall in ination of the home country is less than the world average decline.
Therefore ination must also fall in the foreign country.
We may also ask what would happen if the foreign central bank followed the non-optimal
rule (21), setting its policy rate equal to the foreign natural real interest rate. In that case,
we nd that the foreign country would experience ination and a positive output gap.
Proposition 3 If the foreign central bank, non-optimally, closes the interest gap, r
t = e r
t,
there would be a contraction and deation in the home economy, b nt < 0, Ht < 0 and result
in expansion and ination in the foreign economy b n
t > 0, Ft > 0.
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23Since 2 > D
2 > 0, b nR
t < b nW
t < 0. Since the average level of output drops by less than the
relative level, b nt < 0 and b n
t > 0. Add both sides of (33) and (31)
(1   )t = k( + s)b n
W
t + k( + sD)b n
R
t < 0 (46)
Since both b nR
t ;b nW
t < 0, t < 0. Subtract (31) from (33) Subtract the world Phillips curve
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)

t = k( + s)b n
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t   k( + sD)b n
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Multiply both sides of the equation by D
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5.3 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now extend the analysis to encompass the joint determination of monetary and scal
policy together. Since active scal policy involves having non-zero scal `gaps' it is useful
rst to state some basic results concerning the impact of scal spending policies in this
model. From Cook and Devereux, (2011), we can establish the following:
Proposition 4 In a liquidity trap in both countries, a) the domestic scal multiplier is
greater than unity, b) the cross country scal multiplier is negative, and c) a scal expansion
generates a terms of trade deterioration.
Proof. See Cook and Devereux (2011)
The logic behind the proposition is that a persistent scal expansion will raise expected
ination in the domestic economy, which, with a xed nominal interest rate, will tend to
reduce the real interest rate, and crowd in domestic consumption, thus generating a multi-
plier in excess of unity. But by the same token, the fall in the nominal interest rate must be
24accompanied by an expected terms of trade appreciation, which necessitates immediate de-
preciation. In the same way that the terms of trade appreciate following a fall in demand, in
a liquidity trap, they depreciate following a scal expansion. But this depreciation generates
a fall in demand in the rest of the world, so the cross country multiplier is negative.
With these results, we go on to compute the jointly optimal scal and monetary policy
response to the demand shock. Again, the cooperative optimal policy response to a liquidity
trap involves maximizing (22) in each period, taking expectations of all future variables as
given, subject to the ination equations for world averages and dierences, given by (14) and
(16), and subject to the non-negativity constraints on nominal interest rates in each country.
Since from the results of the previous section we know that the non-negatively constraint on
the home country policy rate will always bind for the duration of the shock, we only impose
the non-negativity condition on the foreign interest rate.
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The rst two constraints are the ination equations in average and relative terms. The
second two constraints are the average and relative `IS' equations. The nal constraint
is the non-negativity constraint on the foreign policy interest rate. The policy optimum
involves the choice of the output gaps, the government spending `gaps', the ination rates
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t = 0 (53)
These equations, in conjunction with (14)-(17), give the conditions determining average
and relative output gaps, ination rates, scal gaps, Lagrange multipliers, and the value of
either  or r
t. As in the previous subsection, we can reduce these equation into a condition
which determines whether the foreign country's policy rate is positive or constrained by the
zero bound. But now this is simultaneously determined with the size of the average and
relative scal gaps. First, take (48), (50) and (51). Combine these with (14) and (15) to get
the relationship between the world average scal gap and the interest rate gap as follows:
[(2HL + 3BL) + f(1   )s]b cg
W







where 3 = 2 + k > 0, HL  H + L > 0, BL  B + L > 0 and f  k > 0. Since
r
t  0, from this, it is clear that when the world average natural rate falls below zero, the
world average scal gap must increase.
Note that, outside a liquidity trap, it would never be desirable to have a non-zero scal
gap. But when at least one of the the policy rates is constrained by the zero lower bound,
the world output gap is negative, and ination is negative. Then scal spending, by creating
anticipated ination, can reduce real interest rates, stimulate private demand, and reduce
the current world output gap.
We may use a similar procedure to compute the relationship between the relative scal
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2 + k > 0, FJ  F + J > 0, and JA  J + A > 0.
Note when v = 1, given that " < "(1), it must be that both countries are constrained by
the zero bound. In addition, it must be that e rR
t = 0. Therefore, both countries must have
identical and positive scal gaps.
26More generally, for the case v  1, since r
t  0 and e rR
t  0, the expression (55) cannot
immediately be signed. But it is shown below that r
t   e r
t  e rt. Hence the relative scal
gap is always non-negative. It follows then that the home country scal gap will always be
positive.
Finally, we may use (53), (48), (47), (51), (52), in conjunction with (14) and (17) to
compute a solution for  as:













where  (v) and  D(v) satisfy the condition that  D(v)   (v), with  D(2) =  (2) 7
Equation (56) satises the same properties as (41) in the previous subsection. In partic-
ular, when v = 1, then r
t = 0, e rR
t = 0, and so  > 0, ensuring that the foreign zero bound
constraint is binding. In that case, it can immediately be seen from (54) and (55) that the
home and foreign scal gaps are equal, and positive. Alternatively, in the case v = 2, then
(56) gives the solution r
t = e r
t and then  = 0, so the zero bound constraint is binding. In
this case the home scal gaps are positive, and the foreign scal gaps are zero.
As before, there is a critical value for v, denoted v, such that for v  v, then r
t > 0. In
this case, since  = 0, we may derive the optimal value of r
t from (56) itself. In summary,
we may then dene the behavior of the foreign policy interest rate in the same way as before.
Thus:
For 1  v  v;r

t = 0
For v < v < 2;r








With the condition that  D   , this ensures that r
t   e r
t  e rt, as stated above. Thus,
the characteristics of monetary policy are similar to those of the last section. The dierence
is that now monetary policy response on the part of the foreign country is augmented by
positive scal gaps on the part of one or both governments. Note also that the stance of
monetary policy will aect the optimal scal gaps chosen by each country. Only when there
is substantial trade openness, so that v  v, and r
t = 0, will monetary policy play no role
in an optimal policy. More generally, there is an interaction between the optimal scal and
monetary responses to a liquidity trap in one country. The way in which this takes place is
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27explored in the following section.
6 Numerical Analysis of Optimal Policy
We now provide a numerical illustration of the jointly optimal cooperative monetary scal
policy. To evaluate the economy quantitatively, we adopt some parameters from Cook and
Devereux (2010a). Let  = 0:99, so each period is a quarter, and this translates to a value
of the steady state interest rate r = 0:01. The Frisch labor supply elasticity is set at  = 1.
Price stickiness is  = 0:85, so that k = 0:027; as in Christiano et al. (2009). Let the share
of government in output be 20 percent, so that cy = 0:8. We assume the inverse of the
intertemporal demand elasticity ; is equal to 2. The persistence of the demand shock is set
at 0.8 ( = 0:8) implying an expected length of the slump to be 5 quarters. We set the
elasticity of substitution between individual good varieties within a country, , equal to 5.
Finally, we set the preference shock in the home country " so that at v = 1 (the case without
any home bias), the natural real interest rate at the quarterly frequency would fall from 1
percent to -1.7 percent, with persistence .
Figure 4 illustrates the response of home and foreign output gaps, home and foreign
government spending gaps, home and foreign ination, the foreign country optimal policy
rate, as well as the foreign natural real interest rate, and the home country terms of trade,
for dierent values of v, when the optimal scal and monetary policy response is chosen.
The Figure takes account of condition (57), so that, at each value of v, the non-negativity
constraint on r
t is tested, and if it is not binding, the optimal foreign policy rate is chosen to
satisfy (57). The rst thing to note is that at v = 1, then clearly the zero bound is binding
in both countries, and all variables respond in the same way in the two countries. The
output gap falls by over 7 percent in both countries, and this is coupled with a fall in the
rate of ination by equal amounts. Since both countries are aected equally, and interest
rates are zero, adjusting the scal gaps is the only possible policy response to the shock.
The Figure shows a a positive response of the scal gap in each country. Thus, scal policy
should behave counter-cyclically, and equally so in each country for a world without home
bias in preferences.
Now, as v rises above unity, we know that the impact of the shock on the foreign natural
interest rate becomes muted, while the opposite occurs for the home natural interest rate.
The negative response of the foreign output gap is then reduced, while that of the home
output gap is increased. As v rises more and more, holding the foreign policy rate constant,
28the foreign output gap may actually increase. This is due to the sharp terms of trade ap-
preciation of the home country, leading to an expenditure switching towards foreign output.
A similar dynamic occurs in the response of the ination rates in the two countries - home
ination becomes more and more negative as v rises, while the negative response of foreign
ination becomes less and less. The optimal response of scal policy gaps is illustrated in
panel b of the Figure. As v rises, home scal policy becomes more aggressive, while the
foreign scal policy becomes more muted.
Panel d illustrates the optimal response of the foreign country policy rate, alongside the
foreign country natural real interest rate. Note that at v = 1, the foreign policy rate is
stuck at zero, while the natural real interest rate is at  0:017: As v rises, the response of
the foreign natural interest rate becomes less and less, as is obvious from the formula (57).
Eventually, as v rises to 2, the foreign country would be entirely unaected by the shock,
and the foreign natural interest rate would rise to 0:01, the steady state natural interest rate.
But the key feature of panel d is that the foreign country will raise its policy rate above zero
for values of e r
t < 0. That is, the foreign country will choose positive interest rates after
point v as part of an optimal cooperative policy package, even though, by the usual closed
economy logic, it should be still in a liquidity trap, since its natural rate of interest is below
zero. Equivalently, the foreign country will not follow a policy of osetting the movement
in the foreign natural interest rate to the greatest extent that it can, so long as the policy
rate is above the zero bound. Rather, it chooses to raise policy rates, even though e r
t < 0.
In fact, panel d makes clear that, above v, the foreign country will always set its policy rate
above the steady state natural rate of interest. Thus, by any denition of the term, the
optimal monetary stance for the foreign country, in face of the home liquidity trap, is to
tighten its monetary policy.
So an optimal cooperative policy response to a liquidity trap can be characterized by
expansionary scal policy in all countries, but contractionary monetary policy in the least
aected country. This seemingly paradoxical result is related to the results of section (4)
above. As v rises, the home economy is signicantly more aected by the negative demand
shock. An optimal policy response is to raise world demand, and to re-orient world demand
towards the home country. Raising world demand is accomplished by expansionary scal
policy, and particularly so in the country which is the source of the demand shock. But
reorientation of demand towards the source country is achieved by tighter monetary policy
in the least aected country. The raising of the foreign policy rate is associated with an
appreciation of the foreign currency, which generates an additional expenditure switching of
demand towards the home country. Since the impact of the home country shock on foreign
29output is positive in any case, when v is suciently greater than unity, the rise in the foreign
policy rate has the additional benet that it helps to minimize the response of the foreign
output gap to the home country shock. The Figure shows that the tightening of the policy
rate in the foreign country as v rises reduces the degree to which the home terms of trade
appreciates in response to the initial savings shock.
We note that, when an optimal foreign monetary policy is used, the foreign country has
a very small scal gap. While it is optimal for the foreign country to follow an expansionary
scal policy. But quantitatively, the size of the scal expansion is much less than that of the
home country.
Figure 5 provides further illustration of the key interaction between monetary and scal
policy in responding to the liquidity trap in the home country. The Figure contrasts the
optimal policy for scal and monetary policy to that where scal policy is set optimally, but
monetary policy is set according to the conventional rule (21). Thus, the foreign country sets
the policy rate equal to zero when the natural real interest rate is negative, and equal to the
natural real interest rate when it is above zero. The Figure shows that the response of scal
policy under this alternative (non-optimal) monetary rule is substantially dierent when
v > 1. The key feature of this policy is that it is excessively expansionary for the foreign
economy, relative to the optimal rule. As v rises more and more, the foreign economy
experiences a boom, which is countered by a contractionary scal policy. At the same
time, the outcome of expansionary monetary and contractionary scal policy in the foreign
country leads to an excessive contraction in the home economy, which then requires a much
greater scal expansion than would take place under the optimal policy. This comparison
makes clear that the optimal foreign monetary policy adjustment in eect reduces the extent
to which the home country has to engage in expansionary scal policy in response to the
liquidity trap. It does so precisely by tempering the sharp terms of trade appreciation of
the home economy. Note from panel e that under the non-optimal monetary rule (21), the
terms of trade appreciates much more for the home economy that it would under the optimal
policy. In addition, under this non-optimal rule, the foreign economy experiences ination,
while the deation in the home economy is substantially greater than it would be under the
optimal policy.
7 Conclusions
The experience of major recessions in many of the worlds largest economic regions, together
with low or zero interest rates, has reduced condence in the ability of monetary policy to
30respond to economic shocks, and suggests that only scal policy can be used as a coun-
tercyclical device. This paper shows that in a world economy where countries are aected
in dierent ways by `liquidity trap' shocks, monetary and scal policy may be used in mu-
tually supportive ways, and in some cases the standard prescriptions for monetary policy
response to a liquidity trap may fail to apply. A relatively tight monetary policy in the least
hit country facilitates an ecient redirection of world spending, and reduces the extent to
which scal expansion must be used to raise world expenditure. The key useful feature of
monetary policy in our model is that it tempers the perverse response of real exchange rates
to shocks that occurs in a liquidity trap. The underlying message of the paper is that in a
liquidity trap, the exchange rate response may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the impact
of negative demand shocks.
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Figure 4: Optimal Policy





















































































Figure 5: Optimal and Constrained Policy
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